Summary: This article will argue that scholars concerned with the nexus between socialism and nationalism have overlooked the work of Eric Hobsbawm, the foremost present-day Marxist historian and a key theorist of modern nationalism. The article will repair that neglect by providing the first systematic analysis of Hobsbawm's encounter with the national question. It will contend that Hobsbawm's work is a key site for those interested in exploring the clash between classconsciousness and national identity, and that his historical and political writing provides a unique window on the nexus between nationalism and socialism in the last half of the twentieth century. The article will also suggest that Hobsbawm's changing conception of the relationship between nationalism and socialism is crucial to an understanding of the shifts his politics have undergone in the last three decades or so.
national question has increasingly displaced other concerns in his workthe bandits of Spanish and Italian anarchism replaced by the bandits of Serbian and Croatian nationalism; socialist revolutionaries replaced by the revolutionaries of Scottish and Québécois separatism; the worlds of labour replaced by the world of nations. 9 By the beginning of the new century, the national question assumed the central object of his thought. 10 This article will provide a systematic analysis of Hobsbawm's conception of the relationship between socialism and nationalism in both his historical work and his political interventions. The article will begin with a brief description of Hobsbawm's ''social being'', the conditions, not of his own making, which shaped his thinking on nation and nationalism. 11 The substance of the article will constitute an analysis of Hobsbawm's understanding of the national question grouped around three issues: (1) Are socialism and nationalism incompatible?; (2) Do the workers have a country?; and (3) What is the future of nationhood and nationalism? The article will end with a brief examination of Hobsbawm's assessment of the place of socialism and nationalism in our own time. To anticipate a conclusion, this article will argue that Hobsbawm's encounter with the national question has not only given rise to a formidable, though conflicted, analysis of nation and nationalism, but has also been central to his conception of socialism's past, present and future. Germany, whose language he first spoke and where he lived in his early teenage years before the death of his parents? 13 England, where his uncle moved in the wake of Hitler's rise to power, and where Hobsbawm, who followed him, went to university? Great Britain, whose Communist Party Hobsbawm joined in 1936, in whose army he served during the years of World War II, and whose integrity he defended against the rise of fissiparous nationalisms in the 1970s? 14 In truth, none fit. Hobsbawm is a Marxist historian who speaks and writes in at least four different languages (English, German, Italian, and French), who rejected the religion (Judaism) of his birth in favor of a secular ideology (socialism), and who throughout his life has lived in at least four countries (Austria, Germany, England, and the United States), felt at home in at least two others (Italy and France), but refers to none as his homeland. A rootless cosmopolitan, that most execrated figure of nationalist rhetoric, Hobsbawm does not have a country. 15 Like those members of the ''trade guild'' (history) to whom he has long felt a deep allegiance, he constitutes a ''migrant bird, at home in arctic and tropic, overflying half the globe''. 16 It was not just his ancestry, the circumstances of his birth, and the involuntary geographical mobility of his early years that left him without a country. Rather Hobsbawm's nationless identity 17 was a direct consequence of his commitment to that internationalist ideology par excellence, Marxism, a commitment that mushroomed in the Berlin of the early 1930s. 18 This was not an unlikely place for such an identity to develop, 13 . This would perhaps be the most likely candidate, at least for linguistic nationalists. 14. Some have made this claim. See T. Nairn especially not for a Jew. As the Weimar Republic descended into crisis, undermined by the ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic politics of Hitlerite fascism, Jews increasingly found themselves constituted as Germany's foundational ''Other''. In such circumstances, rather than an ''opiate of the intellectuals'', in Raymond Aron's acerbic phrase, Marxism, for many (German) Jews, appeared a political necessity. As Hobsbawm later recalled: ''We [Jews] simply choose a future, rather than no future, which meant revolution. But it meant revolution not in a negative sense but in a positive sense: a new world rather than no world.'' 19 For Hobsbawm, that implied the global transformation of a system of production that had produced endemic poverty, war, and fascism -in short, a new world required world revolution. In the early 1930s this was not a quixotic Marxist fancy. 20 According to Age of Extremes, the twentieth century ''cannot be understood without the Russian revolution and its direct and indirect effects''. 21 The same might be said of Hobsbawm. 22 For him, as for so many other west European Marxists in the 1930s, the Soviet Union and its project of world revolution constituted an already existing alternative to capitalism and fascism, to an old order which events seemed to prove was no longer viable. In this vision, where Nazism offered national socialism as a salve to capitalism's ills, the Soviet Union offered the socialist Cosmopolis free from poverty and want; where Nazism promised eternal war between races, the Soviet Union promised universal peace; and where Nazism exalted the supremacy of the German people and the irrational, the Soviet Union exalted universal equality and reason. In a world unhinged by economic and political collapse, it was an appealing vision.
W H A T I S H O B S B A W M ' S C O U N T R Y ? T H E M A K I N G O F A M A R X I S T H I S T O R I
For the young Hobsbawm it was overwhelming: there was only one means to overcome the seemingly interlaced absurdities of capitalism and fascism -worldwide socialist revolution, the project begun by the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917. Thus when Hobsbawm became a communist in the Berlin of 1932, beginning an association which would last until the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, he was not only endorsing the view that communism offered a universal alternative to economic catastrophe and fascism. He was also affirming that socialist revolution was his homeland and that the sole community worth imagining or belonging to was one that included all the peoples of the world. 23 The memory of this moment would leave a deep imprint on his life; indeed Hobsbawm's intellectual and political contributions would be insensible without it.
When Hobsbawm left Germany for England in 1933, then, he had already committed himself to a set of beliefs that would endure and been gripped by what he later characterized as ''that typical twentieth-century passion, political commitment''. 24 Like Germany, his new home had also been rocked by the almost worldwide crisis of capitalism. 25 However, unlike Weimar Germany, England did not give birth to a mass revolutionary workers' movement. Thus, although Hobsbawm remained a communist during the initial years of his stay in London, the circumstances made it hard to imagine life as a professional revolutionary, at that time his preferred vocation. Having escaped Berlin shortly after the rise of Hitler, in England he would explore Marxism through books rather than the immediate struggle against fascism as he had in the last months of his life in Berlin. With the memories of those times still ''spiritually'' present, it was during a three-year hiatus from politics before he began university that the disciplinary appellation of the identity Marxist historian was born.
26
The disciplinary and the political aspects of Hobsbawm's identity coalesced in 1936 when he went to Cambridge to study history and joined the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). 27 Active in the student communist milieu at Cambridge in the late 1930s, a time when the ranks of communism were swelled by the rise of fascism, the Spanish Civil War, and the politics of the Popular Front, Hobsbawm spent the war years fulfilling a number of banal duties in the British army, perhaps barred from more active involvement by his Bolshevik politics. 28 The experience of the Popular Front period and the ''People's War'', however, constituted crucial moments in Hobsbawm's political formation, moments which would in part determine not just the character of his Marxist politics but also his understanding of the potential value of patriotism to international socialism. Allowing reconciliation between communists, national social democrats and conservative patriots, the Popular Front against fascism provided Hobsbawm with crucial strategic insights into the way socialism could be advanced in conditions where revolution had been either stalled or temporarily defeated. 29 Indeed, popular resistance to fascism was central to the political and intellectual development of many of the members of the Communist Party Historians' Group (CPHG), of which Hobsbawm was a prominent member throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. 30 Developments in British communism in the immediate period after 1945 -the ''British road to socialism'' -were also important in this respect. 31 This period in British communism's history constituted a self-conscious attempt by the CPGB to extend the strategy of the Popular Front into the immediate postwar years, aligning the cause of national reconstruction to international socialism; 32 it also overdetermined the tradition of British Marxist historiography, a tradition which would have a disproportionate influence on the development of Anglo-American intellectual thought in the last half of the twentieth century. 33 Thus, Hobsbawm's commitment to international communism remained intact through and immediately after World War II. More surprisingly, it remained intact throughout 1956 -that year of the revelation of Stalinism's crimes and the Soviet invasion of Hungary -as well. Hobsbawm's decision to remain a member of the CPGB is surprising because so many other members of the CPHG, including E.P. Thompson Nonetheless, although what was true at the time can only be a matter of speculation, it might be noted that Hobsbawm's continuing association with international communism allowed him access to an international milieu characterized by comradeship and intellectual fraternity, a milieu that would have been denied him had he renounced communism in 1956. For example, in Primitive Rebels he acknowledged the help and support his path-breaking research on ''archaic'' forms of social movement had received from various functionaries and officials in the Italian Communist party. From this it might be concluded that his politics were not always an obstruction to his career as a scholar. 40 In other words, in some countries, 48 A historian who happened to be a socialist rather than a socialist-historian, Hobsbawm, as a chapter in Interesting Times suggests, was a ''watcher in politics''. This sense of himself as a ''watcher in politics'' was reflected in his ''mode of writing''. Whether in his historical writings or his historically informed political journalism, Hobsbawm wrote from an Olympian perspective, a perspective that perhaps came easily and appropriately to a figure who was consistently forced to live in between homes. Deracination, however, gave rise not just to a sense of political detachment, but also to a disavowal of human agency, whether in history or everyday political practice. Rather than seek out those alternative ''practices of possibility'' or ''resources of hope'' that other socialists saw as crucial to socialism's future after 1956, Hobsbawm was a Marxist historian who was primarily interested in interpreting the world, not changing it. A form of historical practice that was predominantly concerned with patterns and structures was unlikely to give rise to new forms of socialist praxis -there was a (political) world of difference in tone between The Making of the English Working Class and The Age of Revolution.
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By some time during the 1960s (The New Century suggested as early as 1956), 50 Hobsbawm believed that the socialist project was doomed. the Sino-Soviet split, and the wretched condition of socialism's stateplanned economies. However, he believed that once it became clear that the working class in advanced capitalist societies had not only deserted revolution but was structurally incapable of perpetuating it, the project of world revolution had to be abandoned. If this wasn't problem enough, he caught early sight of another potentially insurmountable obstruction to socialist progress. In the late 1960s there appeared a force in western Europe that socialists (and many liberals) had claimed to have already reckoned with: nationalism. 52 Its return, Hobsbawm felt at the time, and later admitted, would prove fatal to the ''universalism'' of the historic Left.
T H E J O U R N E Y A N D T H E D E T O U R : S O C I A L I S M A N D N A T I O N A L I S M
Despite the Communist Manifesto's claim that national particularism would be swept away by the establishment of a global market, Marxists in the twentieth century were forced to come to terms with capitalism's world of nations and its consequences for Marxist theory and socialist practice. How could an ostensibly cosmopolitan ideology operate within a world populated by nationalisms? Marxists have offered a number of solutions to socialism's national dilemma. 55 In one view (associated with the thought of Rosa Luxemburg) it was argued that Marxists should have nothing to do with nationalism because it undermined class-consciousness and diverted the proletariat from their ''true'' class interest. 56 In another view (associated with Leninism), it was argued that Marxists, under certain circumstances, could marry social and national liberation to the benefit of world socialism. 57 Here, armed with ''rights'', and divided into ''oppressor'' and ''oppressed'', nations were figured as deserving of freedom and consequently of socialist support. 58 However, beyond this instrumental nationalism, other Marxists claimed that nationalism (even national separatism) was a necessary detour on the journey toward socialism. In the discourse of English-speaking Marxism, this contention was most famously advanced by Tom Nairn in the context of the rise of separatist nationalisms in Britain in the last half of the twentieth century. 59 Nairn's argument in favor of ''neo-nationalism'' prompted Hobsbawm's reflections on the problem of nationalism for socialist politics in the late 1970s.
Could Marxists become nationalists as socialists such as Nairn in his The Break-Up of Britain suggested they must? Not according to Hobsbawm. For him, Marxists could be nationalists neither in theory nor in practice. was irrational and sustained by a set of myths which Marxists should refuse because they bore no relation to historical reality -a set of myths bankrolled by the premise that nations constitute the ''a priori eternal data of human society''. 61 Nor could Marxists be nationalists in practice, Hobsbawm contended, because ''nationalism by definition subordinates all other interests to those of its specific nation''. 62 In his view, nationalism undermined two central axioms of Marxist politics: that nation states are fractured by class and that nationalism constituted a form of class collaboration antagonistic to socialism. In addition, he claimed that nationalism was antithetical to the Marxian vision of ''some form of association or organizational union of nations, possibly preceding [:::] the eventual dissolution of national into global or generally human culture''. 63 Nationalism, according to Hobsbawm, blotted out the Marxist horizon of a universal socialist culture.
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For Hobsbawm, the correct Marxist attitude toward nationalism in practice was ''not unsympathetic, but contingent and not absolute''.
65 ''The fundamental criterion of Marxist pragmatic judgment'', he declared, ''has always been whether nationalism as such, or any specific case of it, advances the cause of socialism; or conversely, how to prevent it from inhibiting its progress; or alternatively, how to mobilize it as a force to assist its progress''. 66 From this strategic parti pris Hobsbawm damned Nairn's political prescriptions in The Break-Up of Britain: national separatism would not help socialism dig capitalism's grave. Hence although Marxists were ''neither for nor against independent statehood for any nation'' 67 in principle, and did not maintain the a priori view that big nations were to be preferred to small ones, in his opinion there was no good reason for supposing that the break-up of Britain (or any other existing state) would advance international socialism. To Hobsbawm's mind the establishment of national states as such could not be transformed into an agent producing socialist change either in addition to or as a replacement for the ''Marxian historic mechanism'' -which, he argued, ''includes the formation of some nation-states as an essential part of capitalist development, and a crucial strategic role for some national movements; but not what nationalism requires, namely a charter for any such state or movement''. 68 Painting nationalism red, Hobsbawm warned, would distort socialist ideology and obliterate the ''science'' of Marxist theory.
69 With Nairn, the detour, he alleged, had become the journey. It was transparent, Hobsbawm suggested, why Marxists had championed nationalism in the past. The criteria here was the advancement of bourgeois society -that is, Marx, for example, had supported particular nationalisms to the degree that they could be understood as promoting the development of the capitalist mode of production.
70 But this ''nationalism'' was not nationalist in the current sense of that term, Hobsbawm argued, because ''it did not envisage a world of nation-states irrespective of size and resources'' -it held that only a limited number of states were viable on certain economic, military and political criteria -and because it ''de facto abandoned the national homogeneity of most accepted 'nation-states'''. 71 Hobsbawm also conceded the strategic value of marrying national and social liberation during the anti-fascist period and in the context of imperialism. 72 In both cases, he believed, nationalism could be understood as a progressive force facilitating rather than inhibiting socialist advance.
But in his commentary on The Break-Up of Britain, Hobsbawm offered no contemporary example of nationalism that Marxists could champion to international socialism's advantage, an assessment that drew the ire of those Marxists still committed to the project of anti-imperialist nationalism. 73 New Right's successful exploitation of the ''national interest'' during the Falklands conflict, he argued that socialism must be reconciled to nationalism rather than constitute its ideological antithesis. A product of his newly found conviction that ''the national'' constituted the necessary ground of all politics, 78 Hobsbawm believed that Marxism had to appropriate national identity for socialist ends. In the early 1980s, along with Stuart Hall and other figures associated with the CPGB journal Marxism Today, Hobsbawm thus urged socialists to agitate for a vision of socialism that was not antagonistic to national belonging. 79 Marxists, Hobsbawm argued, might be right to be wary of patriotism because it obliterated class-consciousness and was traditionally associated with, and better adapted to, a politics of reaction. 80 But, for him, it was precisely because of this that they needed to meld their class politics with national patriotism. 81 The detour, for Hobsbawm, was now an intrinsic part of the journey.
Consequently in this register, nationalism was not necessarily a barrier to socialist advance. The proof of the pudding, Hobsbawm contended, had been in the eating. In the mid-Victorian period Chartists had married a ''militant class-consciousness'' to national chauvinism; 82 through the Popular Front strategy the Comintern had allied patriotism to socialism's anti-fascist cause; and following the end of World War II, communist parties in Italy and France had mobilized the national tradition for socialist ends.
83 Each case had met with some success, and part of that success, Hobsbawm alleged, rested on the ability of socialists to ''wrest away national traditions from the bourgeoisie, to capture the national flag so long waved by the right''. patriotism was any less susceptible ''to ruling-class jingoism, to antiforeign nationalism and [:::] to racism'' 85 than socialists had traditionally supposed. But when socialism and patriotism were harnessed together, he argued, they multiplied not only ''the force of the working-class but [also] its capacity to place itself at the head of a broad coalition for social change, and they even give it possibility of wresting hegemony from the class enemy''. 86 Patriotism, in this view, was a contested discourse open to socialist inflection, while socialism's ability to define the national interest was supposed paramount to the Left's ability to realize political hegemony.
87 For Hobsbawm, in this mind, Marxism could not be antinationalist but must paint itself in the national colors. 88 Thus, in the context of socialist defeat, Hobsbawm dispensed with the notion that socialism was likely to end up subordinate to nationalism in any marriage of the two. Indeed, from the perspective of his critique of The Break-Up of Britain, Hobsbawm's ''socialist patriotism'' was likely to torpedo the central animating purpose of Marxist politics: that nations are divided by class and that ideologies of national patriotism favor class collaboration rather than class conflict. 89 In addition, his ''socialist patriotism'' obliterated if not the internationalism then certainly the cosmopolitanism which he had previously argued was the ultimate horizon of the Marxian worldview. In his earlier mind, it was dangerous for Marxists to be patriots; in his latter mind, it was ''dangerous to leave patriotism exclusively to the right''. 90 In the earlier, Marxists should not paint nationalism red, in the latter he advised socialists to get out their paint brushes.
However, there was no good reason for supposing that his ''socialist patriotism'' was not widening ' 92 The charge is partly justified -although in this register Hobsbawm was an instrumental nationalist rather than a nationalist, i.e. he only supported the maintenance of Britain's ''national'' integrity because he believed the alternative was actively harmful to the future of British socialism -and his conflicted understanding of Marxism's relation to nationalism invited it.
Hence, when it came to the nexus between socialism and nationalism Hobsbawm appeared caught in two minds. In one moment he suggested that Marxists could not be nationalists and endorsed a ''Luxemburgist'' interpretation of the national question. Marxists, he argued, could not ''avoid swimming dead against the stream of local patriotism'', a position reinforced by the historic fact that socialist movements that had sought to mobilize nationalism for their own purpose ''tended to become national not only in form but in substance i.e. nationalist''. 93 This was a past he lamented and warned Marxists against repeating in the context of the rise of separatist nationalism. In another moment, however, he suggested that socialists should attempt to define the nation in socialist ways and that the success of socialism was dependent on a (socialist) rearticulation of nationalism. In this mind he argued that socialists could not legitimate their ideological discourse unless it was reconciled to what Gramsci called the ''national-popular''. 94 What might explain the disjunction between these two views?
One obvious candidate is context. His socialist-patriotism was framed in the depths of Left defeat and New Right triumph, when it appeared that national identity had finally trumped class-consciousness; his socialist internationalism was framed in a period when hopes for socialist advance, no matter how attenuated, could still be entertained, no matter with what degree of hesitation. But there is another related explanation linked to Hobsbawm's biography. The internal conflict within Hobsbawm's understanding of the nexus between socialism and nationalism could be a consequence of the dissonance between his formation as a communist in Berlin during the early 1930s and his later experience of the Popular Front and the ''People's War'' in Britain. Hobsbawm pointed to this discord in Interesting Times: Politically, having actually joined a Communist Party in 1936, I belong to the era of anti-fascist unity and the Popular Front. It continues to determine my strategic thinking in politics to this day. But emotionally, as one converted as a teenager in the Berlin of 1932, I belonged to the generation tied by an almost unbreakable umbilical cord to hope of the world revolution, and of its original home, the October Revolution, however sceptical or critical of the USSR. 95 The discord, as Perry Anderson has suggested, had an important impact on his thought. 96 No more so, it might be argued, than on his thinking about the nexus between socialism and nationalism. 98 In a world where capital allowed ''no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest'', where ''egotistical calculation'' had removed the veil from the ''heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour'', 99 and where exploitation had been rendered cosmopolitan, the proletariat, they maintained, could have no interest in national particularisms. The proletariat was ''an international historical subject'' with ''an international historical aim'': the establishment of planetary socialism. 100 In short, the workers did not have a country. 101 By the beginning of the 1980s, Hobsbawm's assessment of this thesis was blunt: not only was ''it wrong to assume that workers have no country'', but class-consciousness ''neither excludes nor, usually, dominates national sentiments''. 102 In brief, for him, the assessment of Marx at his most cosmopolitan, and his followers at their most anational, had been seriously flawed: ''working-class consciousness'', he believed, ''is probably politically secondary to other kinds of consciousness'', 103 particularly national consciousness. However, the claim that ''the workers have a country'' was no more satisfactory, he argued, than its opposite.
D O W O R K E R S H A V E A C O U N T R Y ? C L A S S -C O N S C I O U S N E S S A N D N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T
A more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between proletariat and nationhood, Hobsbawm contended, was required to transcend the unhelpful dichotomy that maintained the working class was either internationalist or nationalist. Satisfied with proving the existence of working-class nationalism, or with explicating the determinative value of nation over class, and from there the invalidity of a Marxist conception of the national question, most students of nationalism have simply dismissed the Communist Manifesto's thesis as wildly erroneous. Hobsbawm partly agreed. But if he could consent that workers do indeed (at certain historical moments) have a country, this did not imply for him the need to overthrow a Marxist analysis of the national question.
Constructed during Thatcherism's ascent, Hobsbawm's assessment of the relationship between class and nation grew out of an awareness that proletarian identity was complex. If it was clear that the workers did have a country, it did not necessarily follow, he argued, ''that they only have one, and we know what it is''.
104 It was not just that a ''national'' working class has never anywhere constituted an ethnically homogenous body. 105 It was not just that bifurcations other than nationality -like those instituted by religion -were most likely to fracture any ''national'' working class. 106 individual workers with multiple sets of identification. 107 It was that in most cases, he argued, a working class's national identity did not necessarily conflict with its identity as a class. Indeed, no matter how virulent or chauvinistic any particular form of proletarian nationalism, it did not prevent the expression of what Hobsbawm, following Lenin, called a ''trade union consciousness'' -that is, ''the recognition that workers as such need to organize effectively against employers in order to defend and improve their conditions as hired hands''. 108 It was only when class solidarity conflicted with a worker's national identity, or where a national movement existed prior to working-class formation, that national consciousness proved a solvent of proletarian unity. National identity, Hobsbawm argued, did not always and everywhere trump class, at least not in the objective sense of ''trade union consciousness'', and national identity was not automatically irreconcilable with class politics. What nationalism did tend to obliterate was something he called ''socialist consciousness'' -that is, an awareness of the international character of proletarian interest and intent. 109 It was this form of social and cultural expression, Hobsbawm concluded, that had been decisively routed by nationalism.
This argument would provide cold comfort for class warriors who, following The Communist Manifesto, sought to ''point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality''. 110 More hopefully, Hobsbawm's argument did point to the fact that national identity did not always and everywhere trump class. How else could one explain the genuinely ''internationalist'' character of ''trade union consciousness'' in places such as Budapest and Rhondda? 111 How else could one explain those situations, like that prevalent in pre-1914 Vienna, where communal and national differences did not prevent a social democratic party from organizing workers on a class basis? Hence, it was not only specific instances where class interest had proved resistant to fracture along communal or national lines within ''national'' working classes that advised caution when considering the relationship between class and nation. There were also concrete instances of genuine workingclass internationalism where class interest did transcend national borders and communal divisions, where, as Hobsbawm argued, workers experienced internationalism as a genuine reality of their class situation. 112 Nonetheless, class identity, in the sense of an objective sense of classness, did not prevent other forms of identity emerging within any particular working class, especially not national identity; and objective classconsciousness, far from guaranteeing the rise of a socialist consciousness, most often succumbed to other forms of identity when they came into conflict.
Hobsbawm argued that Marxist theory could account for this. Although class, in its objective sense, was a feature of both pre-capitalist and capitalist societies, the span and depth of class-consciousness, he argued, was determined by the experienced scale of economic reality in which subaltern classes lived, labored, and struggled. Pre-capitalist societies, rooted in parcellized, essentially local, economic units were characterized by low ''classness'' among subaltern strata; class and class conflict still existed but class-consciousness was typically fragmented and bounded by the geographic scale of economic production. 113 Constituted as ''territorial states'', capitalist societies, however, were typified by an expanded ''classness'', that is, by what Hobsbawm called ''national'' class-consciousness. In the modern economy, based on the interdependence of national economic units, the ''real and effective classes are national''. 114 The working class's lived experience was the ''national economy''; the ''scale of class consciousness'' was '''national' not global''. 115 A consciousness of the working class's global interests in such a situation was an unrealized potential whose transposition to an existential reality awaited the genuine transnationalization of the world economy. Hence, if nation trumped class then the territorial logic of economic development, Hobsbawm argued, could explain why this was so.
Thus, for Hobsbawm, there were material factors, immersed within the territorial logic of capitalist development, which explained the necessarily national form of proletarian consciousness. Not only had ''the national economy of the state'' been the most important defining force in workers' 
lives;
116 not only had the working class been nationalized from above through the state's extension of citizenship and democracy, and through the homogenizing tendencies of national culture and education; 117 but also working-class organization itself -''national'' trade-union movements, ''national'' labour parties -had effectively nationalized workers from below. Indeed it was precisely mass working-class movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he argued, which had exerted pressure on states to deliver democracy and nascent forms of welfare, effectively transforming proletarians into citizens. Developments in the first three quarters of the twentieth century intensified this process, a process struggled for and endorsed by ''international'' class parties. 118 The welfare state, national labour laws, positive trade union legislation, and the nationalization of industries -all the historic achievements of Western labour movements had deepened the ''nationalization of the masses''. 119 The logic of Hobsbawm's argument, then, was clear: national identity had been as necessary and historically determined a form of consciousness among the working class as class identity, nationalism no less an authentic response to a capitalist world-system rooted in national states than socialism. 120 Hobsbawm's analysis of the nexus between national identity and classconsciousness, then, destabilized (perhaps better, obliterated) many of the long-held axioms of Marxist theory. He argued that class-consciousness was most often trumped by national identity when the two came into conflict, although he noted that the two could coexist easily enough when not in competition. Nonetheless this argument contradicted the view of those Marxists, including Marx and Engels, who claimed that classconsciousness would ultimately extinguish national identity. In addition, if a trade-union consciousness had often coexisted with national identity, sometimes even nationalism, this was certainly not true of socialist consciousness, which, whether in 1914 or 1933, had been consistently undermined by the proletariat's sense of national belonging. Socialist internationalism, Hobsbawm lamented, was more likely to be found among a small group of activist-intellectuals than among the mass of workers.
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There were good historical materialist reasons, Hobsbawm suggested, for why nation had most often overtopped class, reasons moored in the material exigencies of the working class's lived experience. A consciousness of themselves as a global class had been unavailable to the world's workers for much of capitalism's history. Why, then, had the proletariat most often chosen nation over class? Because, Hobsbawm argued, they inhabited national economies and national states. The workers did have a country, and they had a country because it was crucial to the maintenance of their material existence. Given the continuing uneven development of capitalism -the fact that workers' conditions were not the same everywhere -this, he went on to suggest, was unlikely to change. Thus, Hobsbawm's analysis of the nexus between class and nation coalesced into a version of what Alvin W. Gouldner has called ''nightmare Marxism'' 122 -that is, a type of Marxism that could account for Marxism's defeat and explain why the establishment of a worldwide socialist community was impossible. In this view, an eternal national class-consciousness rather than the fulfillment of the Communist Manifesto's call to global class war represented a more probable estimation of the working class's future.
Hobsbawm's ''nightmare Marxism'' was not just informed by his reading of social reality or objective developments, but also by his ''social being'' -his detachment from political activism reflected in a ''mode of writing'' attuned to structure and pattern rather than human agency. Thus, his analysis of the nexus between class-consciousness and national identity often assumed the veneer of fatality, as though the hegemony of nation over class was a historically determined fact rather than a reflection of political contingency. Workers have been mobilized across ethnic and national lines in the past partly because of the political endeavors of class warriors and their organizations. Where class has trumped nation -and Hobsbawm often enough pointed to such examples -this agency has been paramount. In other words, Hobsbawm's analysis of the relationship between national identity and class-consciousness obfuscated or underplayed the contingent effect of political agency in the determination of proletarian identity. Working-class consciousness is not necessarily secondary to national consciousness as Hobsbawm assumed. Rather the nexus between nation and class is in large measure a product of the Capital's accumulation imperative, and its corresponding need to universalize market relations, would necessarily undermine the national basis of industry according to the Communist Manifesto. 123 In a world dominated by the capitalist mode of production, national industries, perhaps even national states, would be swept away by a world market whose limit was profit not nationality. National industry, scientific socialism's founders claimed, would be destroyed ''by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every corner of the globe''. 124 Thus capitalism, in the Communist Manifesto's version of its advance, impelled cosmopolitanism. 125 What did Hobsbawm make of this vision of universal development and national collapse? Through an analysis of his four-volume history of the modern world and his recent writing on the national question, this final section of the article will explore Hobsbawm's understanding of the relationship between ''Gemeinschaft and globalization '' 126 in the last third of the twentieth century. Ritually lionized, although less often analysed, 127 Hobsbawm's history of the modern world can be read as a narrative of how capitalist globalization first created and then enervated the nation state, ''the central institution of politics since the Age of Revolution''. 128 Indeed, structured by a conception of the shifting dialectic between liberalism and nationalism, his tetralogy of the contemporary world explains the rise and fall of the nation state both as a means of organizing the world economy and as a form of social and political organization.
The first volume, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848, maps the genesis of the ''characteristic modern state'' -''a coherent and unbroken area with sharply defined frontiers, governed by a single sovereign authority and according to a fundamental system of administration and law''. 129 The second volume, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, shows how this political superstructure was effectively universalized throughout Europe and explores the complementary imbrications of nation-building and capitalist development. 130 The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 charts the process by which the capitalist world-economy was increasingly constituted as a set of rival national economies competing for profit and influence, tracks ''the retreat of the free competitive market'', 131 and explains how the growth of protectionism, capitalist concentration and centralization, and imperialism prepared the way for the global conflagration of 1914-1918 and the apotheosis of economic autarky during the interwar period.
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These results -war, the Great Slump, and fascism -would be explored in the first half of the final volume of the tetralogy, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, . In its second half, the book tracked the post-World-War-II demise of both national economics and the national state. ''By the end of the [twentieth] century'', Hobsbawm concluded, [:::] the nation-state was on the defensive against a world economy it could not control; against the institutions it had constructed to remedy its own international weakness, such as the European Union; against its apparent financial incapacity to maintain the services to its citizens so confidently undertaken a few decades before; against its real incapacity to maintain what, by its own citizens, was a major function: the maintenance of law and order. 133 In short, the ''range, powers and functions'' of the nation state, which had been extending ''almost continuously'' from the eighteenth century onwards, had been precipitously diminished by the close of the Age of Extremes.
134 Thus, despite the formal persistence of territorially embedded states (the ''United Nations''), at the dawn of a new millennium, Hobsbawm claimed, modern political economy had obliterated the idea of the sovereign, independent nation state to which the French Revolution had given birth. Thus, a history of the contemporary world which opened with the genesis of nationhood in the era of the dual revolutions, closed at the ''end of history'' 135 with the nation state's denouement. The powers of the nation state, according to Hobsbawm, had been attenuated, above all, by an increasingly transnational mode of capitalist production. National economics, he claimed, had been overridden by ''the new international division of labour'', by the growing reach and power of transnational enterprises and by ''the rise of offshore finance''. 136 In short, a world economy now constituted by ''free economic flows across borders'' 137 had ''undermined a major, and since 1945, universal institution: the territorial nation state, since such a state could no longer control more than a diminishing part of its affairs''.
138 Intimations of this view had been present in his earlier writings. In 1979, for example, he maintained that ''the emergence or re-emergence of forms of economic organization which not only cut across or transcend boundaries of national economies but compete with them and may be beyond their control, is hardly to be denied''. 139 His view that an increasingly global market augured the doom of the national state was repeated and extended in Nations and Nationalism since 1780 and in Age of Extremes.
140 By the last century's fin de siècle, according to both books, the co-dependent relationship between nationhood and capitalist development -characteristic of that period of modern history between the French Revolution and the era of decolonization -had been definitively sundered.
Nation states, of course, cannot be reduced to their economic role, no matter how important ''national economics'' to effective independence. 141 In other words, the historic nation state has not only functioned as a ''national economy'' -it has also functioned as a system of welfare, 142 as a means of propagating war and securing civil order, and as a primary locus of meaning and identity. According to Hobsbawm, all these functions of the nation state -welfare, warfare, order and meaning -were in a state of rapid disintegration by the end of the twentieth century. National armies, once a force of national integration and central to both warfare and social order, were being increasingly privatized and professionalized, he claimed, rendering them more akin to the mercenary armies of the eighteenth century rather than the national conscription armies of the early twentieth. 143 Privatized armies were a measure of the international order: ''In military terms'', Hobsbawm trenchantly surmised, ''the idea of a 'world of nations', [was] a nonsense''. 144 If nation states no longer fitted the role of warfare state in terms of international relations by the end of the twentieth century, they were no more likely to be able to guarantee the safety of their own citizens. 145 Indeed, in some cases, Hobsbawm noted, the national state was no longer the sole locus of legitimate violence, public law enforcement having given way to privatized policing. 146 Economic developments had also imperiled the national state's welfare functions. ''Homes fit for Heroes'', New Deals, and Beveridge Reports were anachronisms in an age where economic doxa maintained that all aspects of human life -including health, education and welfare -could be reduced to profit and loss. In such circumstances, the ties which bound citizens to their ''nations'' were being increasingly loosened. Personal meaning and forces of integration would now be found outside the ''traditional'' nation-state -as Hobsbawm believed they were in the exponential growth of ''identity politics'', whether of the religious fundamentalist or the ethnic nationalist type. 147 Unburdened of its economic, political and meaning functions, the nation state, in this view, the universalization of commodity production impelled the destruction of ''national economics'', and even of national states, whether in terms of their social, political or military function. On the other hand he tempered, if not contradicted, this view by asserting that ''national economics'' and the ''welfare state'', at least in developed countries, were becoming stronger and more deeply embedded in nation-states as the capitalist world economy became more and more transnational.
At first sight, contradiction would appear the most obvious conclusion to draw. Antinomy, however, is not always the mark of a fatal flaw in argument; it may express conflicting tendencies in social reality. This is the most fruitful way to approach Hobsbawm's understanding of the nexus between ''Gemeinshaft and globalization''. Thus his ambivalent assessment of the nation state's future was a reflection of a contemporary reality constituted by both the IMF and uneven capitalist development, by global cultural homogeneity and wide divergences in the material conditions of labor. 157 In a world where the life-chances of workers in Beijing and Brisbane were still poles apart, it was hard to argue that the ''national economy'' and the ''national state'' constituted residues of ''prehistory''. 158 But it was equally hard to deny that ''national economics'' and the ''national state'' retained their historic powers in a world dominated by the hegemonic order of capital and where the ideology of neo-liberalism ruled unchallenged. In such circumstances a vacillating ensemble of cosmopolitan and particularist reflexes perhaps constitutes an accurate reflection of objective developments.
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Not just a fine-spun portrayal of social reality, the ambiguity in Hobsbawm's assessment of the relationship between capitalist globalization and the nation state also spoke to and reflected the increasing sophistication and complexity of contemporary historical materialism -its aversion to reductionism, to simplistic explanations deriving from some final instance of determination, and of its increasing ability to incorporate modes of being and identity other than class into its theoretical orbit. It might be argued that these qualities have always characterized Marxism; but Hobsbawm's complex view of the nexus between the nation state and capitalist globalization was a sure sign of historical materialism's ability to comprehend our world's ''erratic unity of opposites''. 160 reflected another contradictory reality: the more penetrating and complex Marxism became, the more vulnerable it was to nightmares. In other words, as historical materialism developed into an ever-more artful tool for understanding the world, it seemed less and less likely to provide an adequate guide for those who sought to change it. Always respectful of empirical controls, historical materialism increasingly faced a social reality that was imperiously set against it. If Hobsbawm's analysis of the relationship between the nation state and capitalist globalization was characterized by complex ambiguity, part product of objective reality, part product of historical materialism's increasing sophistication, what of his assessment of the future of nationalism? According to Hobsbawm, nationalism, like the national state, was vulnerable to the enlightenment derived from the flight of Minerva's owl. In short, he believed nationalism was entering the dusk of its world-historical influence. Paradoxically, ''the end of nationalism'', he argued, was most clearly illuminated by the rise of ethnic nationalism and identity politics in the twentieth century's final decades. 161 Hobsbawm maintained that despite, but also because of, the emergence of separatist nationalisms in traditional nation states and the crystallization of ethnic nationalisms in post-socialist societies, that nationalism no longer constituted a major historical force in the way that it had ''in the era between the French Revolution and the end of imperialist colonialism after World War II''. 162 This argument -that ''nationalism as a vector of historical change '' 163 was now in decline -constituted the most controversial claim of Hobsbawm's mature analysis of the national question -it was the central argument of Nations and Nationalism since 1780 -although it was prefigured in his earlier work. 164 The claim was controversial for it seemed to run against the grain of the facts, especially following the nationalist explosions which attended state socialism's ruin in the last decades of the twentieth century. 165 Hobsbawm did not suppose, however, that there would be less nationalism around. 166 Rather he claimed the nationalism that had facilitated ''the building of a number of 'nations' that combined nation-state and national economy'' 167 would be less in evidence, the sort of nationalism based on a ''body of citizens in a territorial state'', which ''extended the scale of human society'', and which had constituted a ''global programme'' between the late eighteenth-century and the midtwentieth century. 168 This kind of nationalism, he argued, not nationalism tout court, constituted a historical vector in decline. The ethnic and separatist nationalisms that had achieved ascendancy in the last three decades of the twentieth century were radically different to this ''universalist'' nationalism. ''Nationalist'' nationalism, unlike ''universalist'' nationalism, sought to break up existing states, based its claim to nationhood on appeals to ethnicity and language, and repudiated the legacy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. 169 Like identity politics, xenophobia, and racism, ''nationalist'' nationalism, Hobsbawm suggested, was not evidence of nationalism's revitalization but symbolic of the ''distress and fury'' and the ''social disorientation'' characteristic of the late twentieth century, a view wildly out of step with Benedict Anderson's claim ''that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love''. 170 In Hobsbawm's view, not only was ''nationalist'' nationalism more likely to constitute a ''substitute for lost dreams'' 171 rather than an expression of love, it was a pseudo world-historical force which claimed an illusionary vitality from a mistaken association with a ''universalist'' nationalism that had transformed the world between the French Revolution and the 1970s. 172 Thus, as far as ''universalist'' nationalism was concerned, Hobsbawm believed that the Owl had flown -we could now illuminate what it was because its historical strength was exhausted. In fact, his verdict on nationalism's future was not so clear-cut. This is not only because he maintained that we would not see less nationalism around -specifically, the sort that was based on ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, but, above all, because he believed that ''citizen nationalism'', modern-day manifestation of Enlightenment universalism, had a future as an opponent of capitalist globalization beyond the ''end of history''. 173 Recalling his somewhat ambivalent argument about the future of the nation-state, Hobsbawm argued in the mid-1990s that ''citizen nationalism'' constituted not only the primary but the only realistic defense against the brutalizing effects of capitalist globalization and the significant, if errant, force of identity politics.
His commitment to the virtues of citizen nationalism, of course, also recalled his almost life-long belief in the efficacy of the Popular Front. Like the cause of anti-fascism, citizen nationalism, he asserted, was a form of ''identity politics'' which was ''based on a common appeal'', 174 and which could potentially marry national identity to social transformation. Hence, in the face of the ''savageries of identity politics'', 175 Hobsbawm implored the Left (once again) ''to recapture [national symbols] and, as it were, to refuse the devil's armies the monopoly of the best marching tunes''. 176 As a descendent of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, citizen nationalism, Hobsbawm believed, was ''the only foundation for all the aspirations to build societies fit for all human beings to live in anywhere on the Earth, and for the assertion and defense of their human rights as persons''. 177 Citizen nationalism or barbarism -these were the alternative futures that Hobsbawm supposed humanity faced in the new century.
What might account for Hobsbawm's shift from socialist politics to a politics of ''citizen nationalism'' in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries? First Hobsbawm believed that nationalism was now the ''inescapable'' ground of politics. For him, ''national consciousness'' constituted ''the soil in which all other political sentiments grow''. 178 This conclusion was in keeping with his assessment that ''where ideologies are in conflict the appeal to the imagined community of the nation appears to have defeated all challengers'', 179 including the socialist internationalism which had originally inspired his attachment to world revolution. ''We are all nationalists now'' 180 -the words are John Dunn's but Hobsbawm would agree with the sentiment.
What was important, according to Hobsbawm, was what sort of nationalists we were. The only way that a future, an all too possible future, conducive to the imagined community of Le Pen or Tudjman could be averted, he believed, was through the reassertion of the values of citizen nationalism -values, that is, attached to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment project. 181 In terms of Hobsbawm's biography, this was a politics that recalled the England of 1936 rather than the Germany of 1932. In the prevailing circumstances at the century's fin de siècle, this politics, accordingly, was a popular front with the socialism left out -not a politics figured to advance socialism but a politics designed to salvage something from the wreckage of its ruin.
A second explanation of Hobsbawm's shift in politics, linked to the first, provides a deeper solution to the question. Hobsbawm's politics of ''citizen nationalism'' accorded with his recently established assertion that the materialist conception of history did not provide an adequate resource for the attempt to change the world. In effect, Hobsbawm's citizen nationalism constituted a recognition that what he considered the central axioms of Marxian politics -''the sense that the triumph of socialism is the logical end of all historical evolution to date; and the sense that it marks the end of 'prehistory' in that it cannot and will not be an 'antagonistic' society'' 182 -could no longer be entertained. For Hobsbawm, as a means of changing the world, as opposed to a means of interpreting the world, Marxism was dead -especially if it persisted in opposing nationalism. In a world where both nationalism and capitalism appeared something like permanent realities, socialist internationalism, he argued, was not just utopian but impossible. Henceforth Mazzini rather than Marx would constitute Hobsbawm's political guide for the new century. 183 In truth, however, Hobsbawm's citizen nationalism conflicted with other moments in his most recent assessment of the national question. For example, it was out of step with his almost ''Luxemburgist'' belief that ''a 'nation', however we define it, is by definition exclusive and particular''. 184 When advertising the merits of citizen nationalism, he directly contradicted this statement. Similarly, his citizen nationalism was bereft of the acute judgment, found in both The Age of Revolution and Nations and Nationalism since 1780, that even ''universalist'' nationalism contained the potential to turn into its opposite -that is, universalist nationalism was perpetually vulnerable to ethnic and particularistic immolation. 185 In addition, even in his most trenchant endorsement of ''citizen nationalism'' -where he advised the Left to appropriate the language of ''national interest'' -he could still remark that a political discourse rooted in conceptions of ''the community'' constituted an ''ideological cop-out''. 186 If ''the community'' could be described in such terms, why not ''the nation''? And, finally, his ''citizen nationalism'' conflicted with his belief that the major problems that faced the world in the new century -global ecological crisis, the growing gap between rich and poor, and the exponential growth of chemical and biological weapons -could not be solved within the framework of the nation-state. 187 Solutions to these problems, he speculated at such moments, would need to be global not local. In such circumstances, citizen nationalism would appear an inadequate telos for the establishment of a society fit for all humanity.
Given the global nature of the problems capitalism's accumulation process has induced, it might have been supposed that the only imaginable alternative to global capitalism was one that mirrored its reach -a global socialism that transcended nationality and the national state. This is something like the homeland that Hobsbawm identified with on the streets of Berlin in the shadow of Hitler's rise to power: ''a movement for all humanity'', 188 whose aim was ''the emancipation of mankind''. 189 However, as Hobsbawm increasingly realized, you have to be positioned somewhere to say anything at all 190 -and that ''somewhere'' was most often a nation state. Just as socialists have always been forced to operate in national paradigms, so actually-existing socialism of whatever type has so far been dependent on territorial embodiment. 191 If socialist internationalism appeared an unlikely terminus of world history however, no more realistic was ''socialism (or social democracy 192 ) in one country'', for reasons well illuminated in Hobsbawm's work. To the degree that the nation state has been undermined by capitalist globalization, he explained, social democracy had suffered the most severe setbacks. Indeed, he believed that capitalist globalization was the precipitate cause of social democracy's ruin: ''The advance of the globalized economy struck at the foundations of the social-democratic Left, because it undermined its ability to defend its social constituency within national borders through a re-distributive fiscal policy, welfare, and macro-economic stimulation of full employment. '' 193 At the beginning of the new century, the prospects for socialist internationalism and nationalist socialism, of world revolution and a socialist-inspired Popular Front, Hobsbawm argued, appeared hopeless. There was no journey, he concluded, only different types of detour.
Marxist and non-Marxist commentators alike have repeatedly claimed that nationalism constitutes ''Marxism's great theoretical failure''. 194 Indeed, according to one commentator, Marxists have not just got nationalism wrong, they have systematically evaded it. 195 The claim is wide of the mark when applied to the Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm has long been critically engaged with varied dimensions of the national question. As might be expected from a historian without a fixed home, Hobsbawm has swung between differing understandings of the national question, sometimes settling on a version which mimicked his life history of displacement and exile, sometimes reacting against that personal history by offering an understanding of the nation-state and nationalism as perpetual features of humanity's future. His engagement with nationalism in other words has been marked by tensions derived from a political biography coterminous with the history of twentieth-century socialism.
Emotionally committed to the project of world revolution, he has at times rejected nationalism tout court, seeing it only as a form of ideology that covers over class divisions within nation states, here alert to the way that the marriage between socialism and nationalism has most often worked in nationalism's favor. In other moods, his version of nationalism has pointed away from this conclusion. Staring socialist defeat in the face, he has considered nationalism a perennial feature of modern society and has counseled socialists to make their peace with it. In the absence of a viable socialist project he has even fallen back upon a certain version of nationalism as the only safeguard against a future characterized by barbarism. At once confirming nationalism's victory over socialism and the seemingly perpetual existence of national belonging, such a politics has given rise to a series of ambiguities in Hobsbawm's understanding of Marxism's national question. Ambiguity -whether in interpretation or politics -is not always unproductive however. It has certainly not been unproductive in the case of Hobsbawm, who, in his encounter with the national question, has provided us with an intellectually decisive encounter between a Marxist and his nationalist world.
